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7.1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
The chapter offers an institutional approach to the issue of international business 
competitiveness. It is assumed that the micro-level, business-oriented factors of 
competitiveness are influenced by macro-level and institutional factors. These 
institutional factors can be analysed with the FOI model developed at the University 
of Miskolc by the Institute of Economic Theory. 
The FOI model offers a new typology of development factors, but it is also 
capable of structuring these factors along three clear development directions.  
− F, i.e. the future potential of a country; 
− O, i.e. the outside potential of a country; 
− I, i.e. the inside potential of a country. 
The three potentials fundamentally influence the business environment of an 
economy, and therefore have an effect on the international business competitiveness. 
The model enables us to measure the three potentials of the Visegrad countries with 
the FOI-indices. In order to better understand, what background factors drive the 
value of the different F-, O- and I-indices, a factor analysis was conducted. Almost 
150 variables were tested during the analysis. The factor structure deducted from the 
analysis is not only suitable to investigate micro-level competitiveness (e.g. ease of 
doing business), but it can also be used to quantify such background factors as 
national goodwill or investment conditions. 
The discussion section of the chapter presents the FOI-index and the selected factor 
values of the Visegrad countries, and discusses the best practices of well-performing 
countries. 
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7.2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The Concept of Competitiveness 
The word ‘competition’ is the derivative of the Latin expression conpetere, meaning 
seeking a common goal or opportunity together. Despite the original meaning, 
competition in economics is often interpreted as a win or lose case in a zero sum 
game: those who are able to increase their competitiveness, will dominate over those 
who slip behind. Some of the most relevant sources on competitiveness (most 
notably: Porter, 1990) however suggest that competition and the seeking of 
competitiveness can be a win-win game, favouring all parties taking part in the race. 
The level at which competitiveness is explained is another debated area. Traditionally 
competitiveness was interpreted on a microeconomic level. In the microeconomic 
approach the competitiveness of goods and the competitiveness of firms is analysed. 
− The competitiveness of goods and services is mainly dependent on their quality 
and price. These two elements have the greatest influence on the sales volume, 
however other activities like market research, advertising, customer relations, 
distribution channels, customer support also contribute to the competitiveness, 
not to mention the effect of such factors as the change in consumption trends, 
market saturation and barriers to enter a market (Szentes, 2012). 
− The competitiveness of firms is based on their ability to make profits, which on 
the other hand is largely determined by the competitiveness of their goods and 
services. Other factors contributing to the competitiveness are: the ability to 
increase the market share, corporate image and brands, the ability to access 
financial resources (Szentes, 2012; Wach, 2014). 
The concept of macro-level competitiveness, or national competitiveness is 
a relatively new idea. It was first mentioned in the competitiveness literature at the 
beginning of the 1980es (Czakó, 2003). The OECD defines competitiveness as the 
degree to which a state may produce goods and services that should pass the test of 
international competition, and in the same time to maintain and develop its incomes 
at national level (OECD, 1992). The idea of national competitiveness is twofold: 
− On the one hand macro competitiveness shows the ability of a country to sustain 
a high level of national income and a favourable position in the world economy 
(measured by the rate at which a nation can enforce its socioeconomic, political 
and military interest on the international scene). 
− On the other hand it shows the ability of a country to create a business 
environment in which the local firms and businesses are able to compete 
internationally. Porter (1990) went even further by saying that the competitiveness 
of a nation is equal to the competitiveness of its firms. 
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It is therefore impossible to analyse the international competitiveness of Visegrad 
country businesses without the macroeconomic elements of national competitiveness, 
and vice versa: national competitiveness is greatly based on micro-level 
competitiveness (of firms and products). The two best known measurement methods 
developed by the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the International Institute for 
Management Development (IMD) both reflect this interdependency between  
micro- and macro-level competitiveness. 
− The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI, developed by WEF) is based on 12 
pillars all consisting of several factors, but the pillars either characterise the macro 
competitiveness (e.g. institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, 
market size, education, health care), or mezzo and micro competitiveness 
(e.g. labour market, financial market, market of goods, technology and 
innovation). 
− The World Competitiveness Index (WCI, developed by IMD) has 4 main factors, 
but again, these factors are either macroeconomic in nature (e.g. economic 
performance, government intervention and infrastructure), or can directly be 
related to the businesses (Business efficiency). 
Both indices have their pros and cons. The main forte of the GCI is that it reflects 
the differences between developed and developing countries; the WCI on the other 
hand involves a lot more indicators in its analyses of competitiveness. The way their 
pillars and factors were set up however, makes it difficult to identify the strength and 
weaknesses of the Visegrad countries, and the high number of indicators used leads 
to the problem of multicollinearity (for a detailed discussion of GCI and WCI see 
Bartha-Gubik-Tóthné, 2013). 
The FOI Model 
Because of the weaknesses of GCI and WCI, the micro and macro competitiveness of 
the Visegrad group will be evaluated with the FOI model developed at the University 
of Miskolc. The FOI model was primarily developed to measure the development 
potential of Hungary, and to characterise the development paths taken by the 
OECD countries. But as the OECD definition of national competitiveness quoted 
above shows, the factors of development and competitiveness are basically the same. 
A good model that identifies the key factors of development of a country can also be 
used to characterise the key factors of competitiveness. The FOI model therefore 
enables a very delicate analyses of the factors contributing to the competitiveness of 
the Visegrad countries, and so it allows us to carefully identify the strengths of the 
region. This section is therefore made up of four parts: 
− The first part introduces the theoretical background of the FOI model. 
− The second part presents the methodology used to set up the model. 
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− The third part shows how the indices of the model may be calculated for the 
OECD countries. 
− While the final part of this section offers a factor analyses, with the help of which 
the strength and weaknesses of the Visegrad countries may be identified. 
Growth and Development in Economics 
Growth and development are mentioned almost as synonyms in the following 
sections, although the literature usually addresses them separately. The simplest 
approach is to say that growth is the narrower, and development is the more complex 
class, as growth is usually defined as an increase in certain quantitative variables, 
while development describes a process of moving from a lower level of quality to 
a higher one (Szentes, 2011). As the measurement of the phenomena economics 
usually deals with is problematic anyway, the most popular, formalised growth 
models (e.g. Domar, 1947; Harrod, 1948; Solow, 1956; Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988) 
concentrate on the national income or on its per capita version. These models 
therefore map the problem of growth/development through the quantitative change 
of a single indicator, so they offer tools to analyse the problem of growth, the 
narrower category. 
The GDP however – being an aggregate indicator – veils more profound 
processes that are crucial for micro- and macro-level competitiveness, such as the 
structure of the economic system, changes in employment, income distribution or 
the institutional framework, etc. For this reason, from now on, we will use the more 
complex approach to development whenever we touch upon issues of growth and/or 
development paths, factors of growth and/or development, meaning that we interpret 
development and competitiveness as a combination of two things: growth in the 
indicators of national income, and the modernising of the socioeconomic structures. 
Theories of Development 
The different schools of economics have had different views on the rules of the 
economy, and they do not agree on the basic assumptions either; hence, a wide 
variety of theories have been developed over the centuries. While most schools 
implicitly assume that the models used are universal, List (1841) was convinced that 
the classical theories may only apply to the most developed economies; the followers 
of new institutionalism (see Williamson 2000, for example) point out that the 
institutional structure of different countries can be very different. A similar 
confrontation can be observed regarding the development paths. It is widely accepted 
that development is unilinear, meaning that all countries have to go through the 
same development stages (with timing being the only difference among them). 
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Veblen (1919) on the other hand argued against the teleological approach of 
economics, and suggested an evolutionary one instead. 
It worth mentioning that mainstream theories do not consider the effects of 
national interests and bargaining power in their models; heterodox schools on the 
other hand cannot accept the independent development of countries (although there 
is no agreement among them considering the exact nature of the interdependencies). 
It may seem natural to choose the countries and national economies as the unit of 
analysis; Wallerstein (1974), however, when describing the economic history of 
medieval Europe, concludes that modernisation cannot be understood within the 
national economy framework. He chooses the world system as the unit of analysis 
instead. 
Some scholars have developed models with few explanatory factors; others have 
gone for more variables. The well-known growth theories pick one or two variables; 
Porter’s diamond model (1990) combines four quite complex factors; the empirical 
study of Barro (1998) of 100 countries spanning over 30 years finds seven factors 
that are strongly connected to the growth rate of the real GDP. 
The factors of development identified in the economics literature can be 
categorised along many principles, but the location of factors is probably the most 
important division line. 
One camp of economists traces back differences in economic development to 
reasons that can be found inside the country. They point to factors whose presence 
(e.g. physical or human capital) or lack (e.g. government failures) enables high 
growth rates. Another group of economists finds the causes of underdevelopment in 
outside factors. Usually these theories take the differences in the development level as 
given in the world economy, and they assume that these differences lead to 
asymmetric dependencies. The asymmetric dependencies on the other hand make it 
very difficult for underdeveloped countries to catch up with the rich world. 
The inside-outside distinction among the factors of development plays a crucial role 
in the FOI model. 
The FOI Model 
Adam Smith (1776) saw the division of labour as the main source of wealth. The 
countries that are able to extend the division of labour among their firms and citizens 
can become wealthier, as they are able to produce a higher quantity with the same 
labour input. The main finding of the Harrod–Domar model (1947; 1948) is that 
investments are the key to economic growth. Investments on the other hand are 
mainly dependent on the savings rate. Around a decade later Solow (1956) pointed 
out that investments and savings cannot contribute to growth in the long run. In his 
view, long-term economic growth is driven by technical change. 
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Keynes (1936) suggested that crises are generated by limits in demand, and the latter 
may be strengthened by large income differences. The speculative demand for money 
of those who are well off can be especially high, which prevents a substantial part of 
the income from turning into effective market demand. Inequalities in income 
distribution thus can be a setback for balanced growth. 
Schumpeter (1934) stressed that cyclical fluctuations should be regarded as 
a natural part of the economy, as entrepreneurs may only draw profits if they break 
the status quo of equilibrium. The way to break the status quo is through innovation, 
which therefore becomes the primary driver of the cyclical development. McClelland 
(1957) also emphasised the importance of the entrepreneurial class. In his view 
entrepreneurs are the pioneers of development, and their biggest motivator is not 
profit, but the achievement of some special goals (N-achievement). 
When the big colonial empires collapsed, several academics explained the 
situation of the underdeveloped former colonies with a value system and social 
structure that was different from the Western one. In underdeveloped countries the 
rural characteristics of the society are dominant, meaning that labour is inefficient, 
immobile, the social structure is rigid, and the general attitude rejects individualism 
and risk taking (Meier 1964). When local values confront the Western values, the 
society is split into two groups, and a dual social structure is formed (Boeke 1953), 
which is completed with a dual economic structure as well (where the traditional and 
modern sectors are insulated from each other). 
The role of human capital in growth and development is highlighted in various 
forms in the literature. Szentes (2011) quotes from A. Marshall: from a national 
perspective the capital invested in workers’ children is just as productive as capital 
invested in horses or machinery. Newer theories unquestionably suggest that capital 
invested in children is far more productive than that invested in horses and 
machinery. Endogenous growth theories see increasing returns as a prime source of 
long- term growth, and they directly or indirectly explain increasing returns with 
human capital. Lucas (1988) treats human capital as a reproducible one, an element 
of capital that the society is able to broaden at a constant rate. The expansion of 
human capital, on the other hand, leads to a constant increase in the productivity of 
the physical capital. Romer (1986) also can be connected to human capital. In his 
model, investments made in research and development produce positive externalities 
that enable a constant increase in the productivity of physical capital. 
Veblen (1919) points out that human behaviour is deeply affected by 
institutionalised rules of society. His views were taken over by new institutional 
economists (e.g. North, 1993; Williamson, 1998). According to them institutions 
affect the incentive system of an economy, while the incentive system on the other 
hand influences the behaviour, size and competition of firms, the level of investments 
and technological development, and so, ultimately the level of development of an 
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economy. The lack of competitiveness thus is explained by institutional frameworks 
consisting of bad incentives, according to the new institutional school. 
Partially connected to the institutional approach is the theory of government 
failures, which was mainly brought into the attention of development experts by 
Tullock (1993). It was back in the 1960es when Tullock suggested (1967) that the 
super profit that monopolistic structures offer can be an incentive for firms to lobby 
for government regulations granting monopolistic positions and monopoly profits. 
According to calculations made by Krueger (1974), the rent seeking behaviour of 
firms in the field of import licences caused a 7.3% GDP loss in India, and a 15% 
GDP loss in Turkey in 1964. The more corrupt a country is, the weaker the state is, 
the heavier the costs of rent seeking are, and so rent seeking can be one of the major 
obstacles of economic development. 
Porter’s (1990) national competitiveness theory adds some highly complex 
factors to the literature of economic development. A somewhat similar idea is 
suggested by Freeman (1987), who developed the theory of national innovation 
systems. These systems are centred around cooperation among businesses, the 
education system and the research infrastructure. 
The Outside Factors of Competitiveness and Development 
The theory of comparative advantage developed by Ricardo (1817) had become one 
of the cornerstones of the laissez-faire approach of international relations. According 
to Ricardo the highest welfare level can only be ensured if trade is conducted along 
the lines of comparative advantages, and there is a free flow of goods. This free trade 
principle was questioned by many. List (1841) argued against laissez-faire. 
He defended protectionism, and suggested protective tariffs for newly established 
industries (the infant industry argument). His suggestions echoed those of Alexander 
Hamilton (1791) made in the newly formed USA. 
After the Second World War the focus of development economics shifted 
towards the power relations of different countries. Prebisch (1964) and Myrdal 
(1957) point out that underdeveloped states are dependent on richer countries, and 
so the current system of international division of labour is not based on comparative 
advantages. The internal economic structures of most of the developing countries are 
directly influenced by the developed ones through the colonial system (Myrdal: 
forced bilateralism). Balogh (1963) argues that as a result of power inequalities 
among parties, the economic structure of the developing countries has to be adjusted 
time after time to the changes generated by technical progress made in the developed 
economies, and the adjustment process prevents them from achieving long-term 
growth. The dependency relations lead to one-track specialisation (Singer 1964). The 
majority of exports of the developing countries are primary products and 
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commodities, which leads to a decrease in the terms of trade over the long run. 
Bhagwati in his 1958 paper titled “Immiserizing growth” showed that the decrease in 
terms of trade can result in a decrease in the national income even if there is dynamic 
growth in the production of the export sector. One lesson learned from the literature 
of interdependencies is that a diversified export structure can be an important 
competitiveness factor. 
Table 7.1. Inside and outside competitiveness/development factors 
Inside factors Outside factors 
Division of labour  (Smith) 
Free trade – international division of 
labour (Ricardo) 
Savings rate (Harrod-Domar) 
Abundance-scarcity of capital 
Protectionism 
Defence of infant industries (List) 
Equal-unequal income distribution (Keynes) 
Equal or unequal trade partners (Balogh) 
Pressure to fit to modern patterns (Balogh) 
Drive to innovate (Schumpeter) 
Unilateral dependency - diversification 
(Myrdal) 
Entrepreneurial behaviour (McClelland) One-sided specialisation (Singer) 
Rigid-flexible social structure (Meier) 
Imported or organically developed social 
structures (Boeke) 
Immiserizing growth – terms of trade 
(Bhagwati) 
Forced bilateralism (Myrdal) 
Dual-homogeneous economic structures 
(Meier) 
International wage division- mobility of 
labour (Emmanuel) 
Investments into human capital (Marshall) 
Human capital, as a renewable resource 
(Lucas) 
Positive externalities of R&D (Romer) 
Geographical position – core and 
periphery (Wallerstein) 
Institutional incentives (North) 
Path-dependent development 
Investment strategies of multinational 
companies (Furtado) 
Government failure (Tullock) 
Rent-seeking (Krueger) 
Demonstration effect 
National diamond (Porter) 
Innovation systems (Freeman) 
Rule of law, democracy (Barro) 
Source: own study. 
Emmanuel (1972) has gone as far as claiming that trade between developing and 
developed countries is an unequal exchange, which is a manifestation of the 
imperialism of trade. Unequal exchange was triggered by wage differences, and is 
sustained by the immobility of labour. Wallerstein (1974) also accepted the concept 
of unequal exchange, though he argued that it is a result of the different bargaining 
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power of nations. The core-periphery relations and the geographical position 
basically predestine the fate of nations, according to Wallerstein. 
As the role played by transnational companies in the international flow of goods 
and capital became more and more dominant, a great deal of attention was directed 
towards them. Furtado (1970) suggested that the most important development factor 
is not the interdependencies among countries any more, but the investment strategies 
of transnational companies. Transnational companies can bring capital to a country, 
creating jobs, but the newly formed subsidiaries may be isolated from the local 
economy (Singer, 1964). The ability of a country to attract foreign capital, especially 
if the capital is invested in fields that can fit in well to the current economic structure 
of the economy, is another important competitiveness factor. 
The demonstration effects of modern consumer societies are worth mentioning, 
too. Generally the consumers of the developing countries try to follow the 
consumption patterns of the developed nations. This usually has a cut-down effect 
on local growth, as the goods fitting to the most current consumption trends are 
generally produced overseas, so following the trends increases imports, and can 
contribute to the trade balance deficit. 
The Role of Institutions in Development 
According to the followers of the institutional school, institutions affect human 
behaviour, in other words they influence the decisions of economic agents. Veblen 
was the first to point that out (1919), and also added that it is an oversimplification 
to assume that market decisions can be analysed independently from any other 
outside factors, like family, culture, community, politics, etc. His views were 
neglected by mainstream economics, but the topic was brought into the forefront 
again by two new research agendas. 
On the one hand it was proved by a series of psychological experiments that we 
are not capable of making such rational decisions as is assumed by economics. The 
notion of homo economicus was debunked by the theory of bounded rationality 
(Simon, 1957). Agents with bounded rationality behave opportunistically. On the 
other hand Coase’s pioneering article (Coase, 1937) shed light on the fact that the 
transactions conducted among agents are not frictionless, and depending on the rate 
of frictions, very different market solutions may prove to be the most efficient ones. 
If we take a closer look at market transactions, it becomes clear that there are 
numerous social phenomena that are disregarded by mainstream economics, yet they 
influence the opportunistic behaviour of market agents and the rate of frictions 
during transactions. These social phenomena are collectively called institutions. 
Hodgson defines institutions (2006) as systems of established and prevalent 
social rules that structure social interactions. According to the definition above, 
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language, money, etiquette, the measurement system, and firms can all be regarded as 
institutions. Institutions make it easier to calculate and forecast the behaviour of 
agents, thus they contribute to the decrease of uncertainty and frictions during 
transactions. North (1993) offers a similar definition of institutions: institutions are 
the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction. 
Williamson (1998) suggested a hierarchy that proved very useful during our 
analysis. He separated social analysis into four levels (Figure 1). The different levels 
are ranked according to the time needed to change them, but they also show what 
influences what in the society. Higher levels directly influence the level just below 
them, meaning that no practices may be adopted on the lower levels that are not 
compatible with the superior levels. 
Social embeddedness is on top of the hierarchy (L1). Williamson puts norms, 
customs, ethical principles, traditions, conventions and religion into this category. 
Some development factors found in the literature at least partly belong to this level 
(e.g. the dual structure of the society, entrepreneurial behaviour). 
The institutional environment forms the second level (L2). While the informal 
rules were placed in Level 1, the rules of L2 are formal, codified ones 
(e.g. constitution, laws, property rights). Although the change of Level 2 rules is also 
partly evolutionary in nature, calculated interference is also possible on this level 
(unlike on L1). Such interferences are called first-order economising, which is about 
finding the ideal combination of formal rules. Many of the development factors 
belong to the institutional environment: the rule of law, democratic rights, market 
regulation and protectionism. 
First-order economising, however, does not ensure the optimal economic 
structure. As agents behave opportunistically, they do not keep the formal rules of 
the economy all the time. Jurisdiction has also got its frictions, meaning that those 
who follow the rules are not able to enforce their rights against the opportunists 
instantly and without any costs. This is where the third level (L3) kicks in, called 
governance by Williamson. The unit of analysis in governance is the transactions 
made among economic agents, and the contracts mediating those transactions. Such 
development factors as the coordination of education and research, Porter’s national 
diamond, government failures or rent seeking, can all be reckoned among L3 items. 
The final level (L4) is concerned with the allocation of resources, an area which 
is traditionally addressed by neoclassical economics. The factors of the better-known 
growth theories (quantities of labour and capital, savings, investments, etc.) all 
belong to this level. 
Williams thinks that new institutional economics addresses problems belonging 
mainly to Levels 2 and 3. North’s and Hodgson’s definitions cited above, however, 
suggest that all phenomena belonging to L1, L2 and L3 can be regarded as 
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institutions. We therefore treat all factors as institutional factors that can be 
categorised in one of the top three levels of Williamson’s hierarchy. 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Economics of institutions 
Source: (Williamson, 1998, p. 26). 
7.3. MATERIAL AND METHODS 
Structure of the FOI Model 
The FOI model is primarily based on the factors collected from the literature, but 
these factors are structured in a unique way which allows us to draw up characteristic 
development paths that can be clearly separated from each other. The distinction 
between development paths also makes possible to identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of business competitiveness in the Visegrad countries. We used the 
following assumptions when the FOI model was set up: 
 
Level Frequency (years) Purpose 
10
2
 - 10
3
 
10 - 10
2
 
1 - 10 
continuous 
Often noncalculative, 
spontaneous 
Get the institutional 
environment right 
1st-order economizing 
Get the governance structures 
right 
2nd-order economizing 
Get the marginal conditions 
right 
3rd-order economizing 
L1 
L2 
L3 
L4 
Embeddedness:  
informal institutions, 
customs, traditions, 
norms, religion 
Governance: play of the 
game – esp. contract 
(aligning governance 
structures with 
transactions) 
Resource allocation and 
employment 
(prices and quantities, 
incentive alignment) 
Institutional 
environment: formal 
rules of the game – esp. 
property (polity, 
judiciary, bureaucracy) 
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− National economies are the unit of our analysis; international interdependencies 
are mostly disregarded. 
− The key to development is not a single factor, but rather a combination of many 
factors. According to our assumption there are several important motors of 
development; sometimes these factors do influence each other, and it is very 
difficult to determine what causes what, still they can be equally important. 
− Among the many factors considered in the model, the so-called institutional 
factors play a primary role. Institutional factors are detected using the hierarchy 
put forward by Williamson (1998). In fact the model was developed with the aim 
of stressing the importance of institutional factors in competitiveness and 
development. 
The FOI model offers a new typology of development factors, but it is also capable of 
structuring these factors along three clear directions of development. As shown 
previously, the inside-outside typology of development factors is a standard part of 
the literature. The FOI model, however, is based on a three-dimensional structure. 
These three dimensions are: 
− F, i.e. the future potential of a country. 
− O, i.e. the outside potential of a country. 
− I, i.e. the inside potential of a country. 
All three dimensions are complex, composed of a large scale of factors. Yet they can 
still be clearly distinguished from each other, which is useful because the clear 
distinction can help in the clarification of strength and weaknesses in micro- and 
macro-level competitiveness.  
The future potential includes factors that are regarded to be crucial for the 
sustainability and future competitiveness of an economy. As sustainability has 
become one of the main paradigms of all social sciences, we felt that the inclusion of 
it as a separate development dimension was essential. In our case sustainability 
translates to ensuring that the typical signs and indicators of a developed country 
characterise not only the current state of the economy but also the relatively distant 
future. 
The outside potential includes factors that are crucial to the current world 
market position of a country. This second dimension can be treated as an equivalent 
of the outside factors listed based on the literature. Some of the elements of the 
outside potential may not be influenced from the inside; others, like the conditions 
affecting the international flow of goods, services and factors of production, are 
a standard part of economic policy. 
The inside potential is made up of factors that are regarded to be crucial to the 
current well-being and development of a country. Most of the inside factors listed in 
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Table 7.1 fall into this potential. Countries that offer favourable conditions to local 
entrepreneurs, and provide a high level of quality of life to their inhabitants, can have 
remarkable inside potential. 
It is not difficult to spot that certain trade-offs exist among the three potentials. 
Higher wage levels, for example, are absolutely favourable from the perspective of the 
inside potential, but they can be dangerous for the outside potential of the country. 
They can also be threatening to the future potential, if the result of a high wage level 
is overconsumption. If a country is well endowed with natural resources, this can 
boost its inside and outside potentials, but the abundance of resources usually leads 
to high proportions of waste, which again harms the future potential. The three 
potentials were drafted with these trade-offs in mind. 
Formulating a Measurement Method 
During a brainstorming session a list of 50 indicators was compiled with the help of 
experts. These 50 indicators were chosen to measure the relevant development 
factors, and they were all included in a questionnaire. Experts were asked to rank all 
50 indicators on a 1-7 scale (1=not relevant at all; 7= of highest significance). Each 
indicator received three separate scores: one for future potential, one for outside 
potential and one for inside potential. The respondents had to give a high score to an 
indicator if they believed it greatly contributed to the sustainability and future 
competitiveness (F potential), current world market position (O potential) or current 
well-being (I potential) of Hungary. The questionnaire was completed by 28 experts. 
Most of them were active members of the Committee on Future Research of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Representing several academic fields (arts, 
engineering, medicine, natural and social sciences), they offered a wide perspective 
and a strong future-oriented attitude, values that are highly useful in this kind of 
research. 
During the processing of the questionnaires every indicator was placed in the 
group (F, O or I potential) where it scored highest, meaning that an indicator could 
only be part of one of the potentials. In order to eliminate some of the less important 
factors (which received low scores in all three dimensions), we disregarded everything 
that had a score below average. The final transformation left us with 27 factors: 12 of 
them influence the future potential, 10 the inside and 5 the outside potential 
(Table 7.2). 
The final version of the model was fine-tuned using the statistical data of the 
OECD countries. 
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Table 7.2. The components of the future, outside and inside potentials 
Future potential Outside potential Inside potential 
Social responsibility (L1-3) 
Trade to GDP ratio (L3-
4) 
Burden of government 
regulation (L2-3) 
Industrial disputes (L1) 
Country credit rating 
(L4) 
Quality of life (L4) 
Energy infrastructure (L3) 
Exchange rate stability 
(L3) 
Collected total tax 
revenues (L3) 
Total public expenditure on 
education per capita (L3) 
Financial institutions' 
transparency (L3) 
Pension funding (L2-3) 
Ageing of society (L1-2) English proficiency (L4) 
GDP (PPP) per capita 
(L4) 
Renewable energies (L3)  Real GDP Growth (L4) 
Healthy life expectancy (L3)  
Ease of access to loans 
(L3) 
Ecological footprint (L1-2)  
Rigidity of employment 
(L3) 
Total expenditure on R&D per 
capita (L3) 
 Labour force (L4) 
Total R&D personnel 
nationwide per capita (L3) 
 Skilled labour (L3) 
Educational assessment / 
Mathematics (L3) 
  
Source: own study. 
 
7.4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The FOI Analysis of the OECD Countries 
To quantify the future, outside and inside potentials, the FOI-indices were 
calculated. The value of the 27 components (listed in Table 2) were gathered for all 
34 OECD members for the year 2010, and then all values were transformed  
to a 1-7 scale using the min-max method. By averaging the standardised values, 
we were able to calculate the F-, O- and I-indices of all 34 countries (Table 3). 
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Table 7.3. The F-, O- and I-indices of the OECD countries 
Country F O I  Country F O I 
Australia 4.20 5.32 4.35  Japan 4.80 3.68 4.01 
Austria 4.70 5.41 4.05  South Korea 4.00 4.26 3.33 
Belgium 3.90 5.56 3.47  Luxembourg 5.30 6.56 4.45 
Canada 3.90 5.41 4.50  Mexico 2.70 3.98 2.85 
Chile 3.80 5.03 4.13  Netherlands 4.40 5.54 3.83 
Czech Republic 3.10 4.97 3.57  New Zealand 4.20 4.52 4.00 
Denmark 4.80 5.77 4.30  Norway 5.20 5.70 4.13 
Estonia 3.00 4.94 3.08  Poland 2.90 4.42 3.07 
Finland 5.00 5.72 4.02  Portugal 3.50 4.33 2.91 
France 4.40 4.46 3.04  Slovakia 3.00 4.82 3.25 
Germany  4.30 5.26 3.73  Slovenia 3.40 5.08 2.70 
Greece  2.90 3.66 2.50  Spain 3.40 4.23 2.99 
Hungary 2.90 4.56 2.55  Sweden  5.10 5.22 4.13 
Iceland 5.90 2.33 4.42  Switzerland 5.40 5.37 4.89 
Ireland 3.90 4.17 3.91  Turkey 3.30 3.63 3.14 
Israel 3.60 4.89 4.13  United Kingdom 3.90 4.35 3.60 
Italy 3.50 3.82 2.66  USA 3.80 4.27 4.47 
Source: own study. 
Factor Analysis 
In order to better understand, what background factors drive the value of the 
different F-, O- and I-indices, a factor analysis was conducted with SPSS 19. Almost 
150 variables were tested during the analysis. In the first step, we checked how 
closely related those variables are to the three index values in the OECD countries, 
and what the direction of the relationship is. As a second step, all variables were only 
considered in the factor analysis of the index they had the highest correlational 
relationship with. 
We were able to establish three main groups of indicators that showed 
a significant correlation with the index of the future potential of the OECD 
countries. They were labelled Human capital, Accountable corporations and Quality 
of the education system. The Human capital factor is a combination of indicators 
measuring the education and health sectors, and the productivity. The Accountable 
corporations factor combines such factors as the ethical and social responsibility of 
organisations and the credibility of managers, and so it represents the social, ethical 
and environmental considerations of businesses. The third factor, Quality of 
education system, shows the returns on efforts made in the education system. 
Two factors were found with the factor analysis of the O-index, namely 
National goodwill and Investment conditions. The main distinction between the two 
factors is the time frame within which their indicators may be influenced by the 
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decision maker. The Investment conditions factor includes variables that can be 
influenced relatively easily, even over the short term; the National goodwill on the 
other hand may only be changed over the very long term. 
Table 7.4. The factors of the F-, O- and I-index 
F-index O-index I-index 
F1 Human capital O1 National goodwill 
I1 Business 
competitiveness 
Labour productivity (PPP)  
Overall productivity (PPP)  
Total health expenditure per capita  
Total public expenditure on 
education per capita  
Healthy life expectancy  
Total expenditure on R&D per 
capita 
Parallel economy  
Investment risk  
Image abroad  
Country credit rating  
Brain drain  
Risk of political 
instability  
Innovative capacity  
Productivity of companies  
Small and medium-size 
enterprises  
Information technology  
Large corporations 
 
F2 Accountable corporations 
O2 Investment 
conditions 
I2 Government 
intervention 
Ethical practices  
Social responsibility  
Credibility of managers  
Foreign investors  
Exchange rate stability  
Capital markets  
Investment incentives  
State ownership of 
enterprises 
Subsidies  
Finance and banking 
regulation  
Protectionism  
Legal and regulatory 
framework  
Ease of doing business  
Bureaucracy  
F3 Quality of the education system  
I3 Availability of 
resources 
Educational assessment / 
Mathematics  
Educational assessment / Sciences  
Science in schools  
Educational system 
 
Labour force  
Total primary energy 
supply per capita  
Burden of government 
regulation  
Employment rate  
Gross domestic savings 
F-index: KMO=0.823, explained proportion 76.4%; O-index: KMO=0.803, explained proportion 
73.7%; I-index: KMO=0.791, explained proportion 73.408% 1 
Source: own study. 
                                                            
1 The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) value helps in determining how suited our variables are to factor 
analysis. A KMO value above 0.8 means that the variables are highly suitable. Principal component 
analysis and Varimax rotation were used during the analysis. 
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Variables having a significant correlation with the I-index can be separated into three 
factors. These factors were labelled Business competitiveness, Government 
intervention and Availability of resources. The Business competitiveness factor 
measures the microeconomic position of all businesses (small and medium-sized 
enterprises and large corporations) along such dimensions as productivity, efficiency 
and R&D&I. The other two factors describe the macroeconomic environment of the 
businesses, where the Government interventions consists of the regulation part and 
the Availability of resources the allocation part. 
The FOI-based Strengths and Weaknesses of the Visegrad Countries 
The Visegrad countries generally have a rather high outside potential, while their 
inside and future potentials are either mediocre or very weak. The index values 
measuring the potentials (Table 3) indicate that the main source of competitiveness 
in the Visegrad countries is the ability to attract outside resources (capital, knowledge 
and technology), and to create goods and services with them that are highly 
demanded on the world market. The best goods and services are thus produced by 
multinational companies, the presence of which is crucial for the competitiveness of 
the region. 
The low values of the I-index on the other hand suggest that these countries 
have been rather weak compared to other OECD members in their ability of 
sustaining a high level of economic growth and achieving high income per capita 
levels. As economic growth and income per capita are the two most commonly used 
macro-level competitiveness indicators, the Visegrad group usually is ranked rather 
low in competitiveness rankings. The main problem however is not the low ranking 
itself, but the fact that low levels of national income automatically mean that the 
income spent on education and health is lagging behind other OECD members as 
well. These are the areas that influence the future potential a great deal, it is not 
surprising that the F-index of Visegrad countries is also weak. 
The FOI-indices only confirm what already can be regarded as common 
knowledge. With the help of the factor analysis we conducted on the OECD 
database however, we are able to look beyond the index values, and so we can 
uncover connections lying behind them. Table 4 shows the factor scores of the four 
countries for all 8 FOI factors. Generally the factor scores are negative, indicating 
a below the average performance compared to the OECD average (the sum of all 34 
OECD members’ scores is 0). The Visegrad group performs especially poorly in 
factors F1 (Human capital), O1 (National goodwill) and I1 (Business 
competitiveness). 
Counterbalancing the weak performance in many competitiveness categories, is 
the high score in O2 factor (Investment conditions) which is well above OECD 
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average in all four countries. Investment condition without a doubt can be named as 
the number one competitiveness edge of the region. We can also find positive factor 
scores for some countries in other categories, but those are not unanimous for all four 
of them. Poland and the Czech Republic perform well in F2 (Accountable 
corporations), for example, but Hungary and Slovakia are quite weak in this 
category. The only other factor where the Visegrad group is not well below average is 
I2 (Government intervention), where the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia are all very close to the mean score of the OECD. The government 
intervention will also be discussed as a strong point of the region therefore. 
Table 7.5. The performance of the Visegrad Countries in the FOI factors 
Factor Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia 
F1 -0.85272 -1.20932 -1.44529 -1.21368 
F2 0.30298 -0.2165 0.44567 -0.56779 
F3 -0.90912 -0.7478 -0.58627 -0.6106 
O1 -0.71219 -1.8377 -0.79603 -1.17267 
O2 0.73518 0.54428 0.27644 0.77455 
I1 -0.49854 -0.77119 -1.13911 -0.72947 
I2 0.02599 -0.00595 0.12561 -0.25579 
I3 0.15515 -1.35754 -0.69183 -0.33357 
Source: own study. 
Competitiveness Edges of the Visegrad Group 
The FOI factors showed that the Investment conditions (O2) and the Government 
intervention (I2) are the two areas where the Visegrad four can gain 
a competitiveness edge over the rest of the world. This final section of Chapter 4 
takes a closer look at the policies of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia to identify the best practices of the region. 
Investment Conditions 
The Visegrad countries have been a target of foreign investors since their transition to 
the market economy in 1989-90. Although – due to its size – the region has never 
been an FDI hotspot (in 2012 around USD 30 billion flew into the V4 economies, 
while China received USD 120 billion, the USA 167 billion according to UNCTAD 
statistics), the steady inflow of investments over the last two decades has led to an 
impressive FDI stock (compared to the size of the economy, see Figure 3).  
The dynamic build up in FDI stocks may be partially explained by the 
transition process: mass privatisation and the opportunity for Western companies to 
get access to local markets. Privatisation revenues in the V4 countries has reached up 
to 5-6% of the GDP on a yearly basis, but they were highly volatile as well. In 
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Hungary there were two major waves during the periods of 1990-1997 and  
2003-2007; in Slovakia a very intensive one during 2000-2004; it was a bit more 
balanced in the Czech Republic with peaks in 1995, 2002 and 2005. But by the end 
of the 2010s the privatisation process halted or slowed down significantly in all three 
countries. Poland was the only exception where after the initial peaks of 1998-2000 
and 2004, there was another big wave of privatisation in 2010-11 (the data are 
available at privatizationbarometer.net). 
 
 
Figure 7.2. The position of the Visegrad countries in Investment conditions O2 compared to 
the best and the worst OECD member 
Source: own study. 
The slowdown or complete halt of privatisation can only be partially explained by 
the depletion of the state-owned enterprises pool. The V4 countries still have the 
most state-owned enterprises within the OECD (Poland had 586, Hungary 358 and 
the Czech Republic 124 in 2008 – Christiansen 2011), and are in the top 10 in 
terms of the ratio of employees working for state-owned enterprises (other countries 
in the top 10 include Norway, Finland, France and Sweden – Christiansen 2011). 
Hence there is a considerable privatisation reserve in the region which could intensify 
the inflow of FDI in the future.  
It worth noting though, that this privatisation reserve may not be on the market 
in the near future. There are signs that prompt to an anti-privatisation shift in the 
attitudes of the policymakers, and even a turn towards nationalisation: there was 
a plan to nationalise private health insurances in Slovakia; a good part of the Polish 
and Hungarian private pension funds had already been merged with the public fund; 
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and the Hungarian government has made a habit of shopping for energy and utilities 
firms in recent years. 
 
 
Figure 7.3. Inward FDI stock in V4 countries as percentage of GDP 
Source: own study based on UNCTAD – World Investment Report. 
Instead of drawing more foreign investors by selling already established companies, 
the Visegrad countries focus on creating a favourable investment climate for 
greenfield investments. All four countries offer very generous support for companies 
that create extra jobs and invest in certain focus industries. The government 
incentives usually include corporate tax relieves (up to 10 years), government grants 
and subsidies paid after the number of jobs created and/or the amount of capital 
invested, and transfer of state property at discounted price. The aid intensity is based 
on regional multipliers, so the same amount of investment can trigger a lot more 
government aid if invested in regions with high unemployment and low level of 
development. 
The investment incentives are focused on some key industries, although the 
level of focus is different from country to country, and generally investments in  
non-key industries are eligible to some government grants too (with higher 
minimum requirements). The focus areas are: 
− Czech Republic: manufacturing in general; technology centres; and business 
support services centres (shared services, software-development and high-tech 
repair services). 
− Hungary: manufacturing in general; research and development; and shared service 
centres. 
− Poland: automotive sector; electronic sector; aviation sector; biotechnology sector; 
modern services sector; and research and development. 
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− Slovakia: manufacturing in general; technology centres; shared services centres; 
tourism. 
Table 7.6. Minimum requirements for government incentives in the V4 countries 
Government incentives CZ HU PL SK 
Minimum number of jobs created 
(focus industry) 
40 25 250 40 
Minimum amount of investment 
(million EUR, focus industry) 
5 1 10-40 
3-10 
1.5-5 (SME) 
Source: http://www.czechinvest.org; http://www.hita.hu; http://www.paiz.gov.pl; http://www.sario.sk). 
Table 7.5 shows the minimum requirements for an investment to be eligible to 
government subsidies. In some cases these requirements are not completely 
comparable, because they vary according to the type of the incentive (subsidy for job 
creation, government grant or tax relief), to the multiplier of the region (developed 
or underdeveloped compared to the country average), and to the size of the investor 
(large company or SME). Hungary has typically the lowest requirements, and Poland 
the highest ones, although Poland has set up the system of Special Investment Zones 
(SEZs), and the SEZs create much lower minimum requirements thanks to their 
multipliers. 
Table 7.7. Typical forms and values of investment incentives in V4 countries 
Government incentives CZ HU PL SK 
Amount of subsidy per job created 
(EUR, focus industry) 
-9.000 
4.000-
8.000 
800-
4.000 
4.000-
10.000 
Duration of corporate tax relief 
(years) 
10 10 NA 10 
Maximum corporate tax relief  
(%) 
100 80 NA 10-35 
Source: http://www.czechinvest.org; http://www.hita.hu; http://www.paiz.gov.pl; http://www.sario.sk). 
There is no great variation in the value of government subsidies either (see Table 6). 
Poland, again, seems to be somewhat stricter in this regard, but the other three 
Visegrad countries have quite similar incentives schemes. Typically companies have 
to agree to sustain their level of activity for 3-5 years to become eligible to 
government aid. In case of the Czech Republic and Hungary, training and retraining 
costs can also be partly funded by the government, which further increase the value 
of the subsidy on a new job created. Companies investing in Polish SEZs are also 
eligible to some corporate tax exemptions, and they can also get a real estate tax 
exemption. The real estate tax is considered a local tax, and so local municipalities 
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have an influence over it. The same applies to Hungary as well, where the local 
governments may grant local business tax relieves for investors. 
The Hungarian government has also introduced the institution of strategic 
alliances. A company can become the strategic ally of Hungary if it has invested 
a considerable amount (worth several hundred millions of Euro) in the country, 
employs a lot of people (several hundred), and signs a contract with the government 
about the alliance. As of early 2014, there were 41 strategic alliances signed in 
Hungary. Although the contract is not very factual in nature, the companies usually 
agree to further increase employment, increase their R&D activity in the country, 
involve more local suppliers in the value chain and stay active supporters of the local 
societies, while the Hungarian government offers tax incentives, eligibility to 
government grants, and public procurement privileges in exchange. 
The exchange rate regimes also influence the investment conditions in the V4 
countries. Interestingly enough the four countries have taken two completely 
opposing routes in this respect. Hungary and Poland allowed their currencies to 
considerably depreciate against the Euro: the Hungarian forint was around 30%, the 
Polish zloty around 25% weaker against the euro in 2014, than they were in the 
middle of 2008. Slovakia on the other hand joined the Eurozone in 2009, 
eliminating all exchange rate volatility compared to the euro. The Czech Republic 
still has its own currency, but the koruna traded close to the 25 CZK/EUR exchange 
rate for most of the post 2008 period, and it is currently around 10% weaker against 
the euro than it was in mid-2008. 
 
 
Figure 7.4. Changes in the forint, koruna and zloty per euro exchange rates  
(2008 August=100%) 
Source: own study based on ECB data: http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=2018794. 
The Czech-Slovakian route is generally regarded as the better one as far as the 
investment conditions go. A stable exchange rate makes it easier to calculate foreign 
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prices, and guarantees the euro value of investments and the profits on those 
investments. Exchange rate stability is considered by some as one of the most 
important indicators of an economic policy committed to the attraction of foreign 
direct investors. 
The depreciation of the local currency on the other hand can also give some 
advantages to investors, although these advantages usually are only temporary. The 
depreciation of the forint and the zloty has made the labour costs of local producers 
a lot lower in euro terms, which is a major competitiveness boost. As Figure 5 shows, 
hourly labour costs (more precisely: hourly labour costs in industry, construction and 
services – except public administration, defense and compulsory social security) were 
almost identical in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia in 2008 (7.8 euros in Hungary, 
7.6 in Poland, and 7.3 in Slovakia). By 2013 however the picture changed: 
Hungarian labour costs slightly decreased over the 5 years, the Polish stayed the 
same, while there was a steady rise in the Slovakian ones. Czech labour costs, just as 
the Slovakian ones, increased over the period. 
 
 
Figure 7.5. Hourly labour cost in the V4 countries (annual average in euros) 
Source: own study based on Eurostat data: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/labour_market/labour_costs/database). 
Despite these differences, low labour costs are still one of the major competitiveness 
edges of the Visegrad countries in general. The hourly labour cost was 10.3 euros in 
2013 in the Czech Republic, which was only 43% of the EU-27 average, and 36% of 
the Euro area average (28.4 euros). 
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Government Intervention 
The factor of government intervention describes the macroeconomic environment of 
businesses. It contains regulations and economic policies, which influence this 
environment. The elements of this factor can be seen in Table 7.4. 
The best performing country of this factor is Luxembourg, the weakest is 
Iceland. As far as this factor is concerned, Visegrad countries are middle-ranking, 
Poland is the 15th, the Czech Republic ranks 17th, Hungary is 18th, Slovakia takes 
the 20th place. Despite the fact that the Visegrad countries' factor scores are close to 
the average of the OECD countries, the countries' performance can be regarded as 
a competitive edge of the Visegrad group. 
 
 
Figure 7.6. The position of the Visegrad countries in government intervention compared to 
the top and worst bottom-ranked OECD member 
Source: own study. 
The rankings of the World Competitiveness Index (WCI), published by the IMD, 
also show the relatively good performance of Visegrad countries in the field of 
government regulation. Here the Czech Republic and Poland improved their 
competitiveness, Hungary and Slovakia regressed in competitiveness during the 
2000s. According to the Government Efficiency Factor, which is one factor out of 
four used to compute the IMD rankings, the Czech Republic ranked 28th, Poland 
was the 35th, Slovakia took the 42nd position and Hungary ranked 52nd in the 
international rankings in 2011. This factor measures the extent to which government 
policies are conducive to competitiveness. Except for Hungary, Visegrad countries 
have improved their position in the last decade. Poland and the Czech Republic 
improved their performance even during the economic crisis.  
The historical heritage of the Visegrad countries plays a significant role in the 
extent and the way of government intervention. Some of the old socialist values and 
institutions are still preserved even today and influence various fields of a county's 
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everyday life. The majority of people still have a strong demand for active 
government contribution (Ferge et al., 1997) especially in the field of health, 
education and pension scheme. 
This fact t is reflected in a relatively high level of government revenues. It is 
only Hungary that has above the OECD average figures since its gained revenue has 
increased in the last decade. As Figure 7 shows, in 2011, the central government 
revenues represented 41.9% of GDP on average across OECD countries, in Hungary 
the revenue amounted to 53.8%, in the Czech Republic it was 40.0%, in Poland it 
accounted for 38.4% and in Slovakia it was 33.3%. 
 
 
Figure 7.7. General government revenues as a percentage of GDP in 2001, 2009 and 2011 
Source: (OECD 2013a, p. 69). 
Central government revenues came primarily from taxes. However, the share of this 
type of revenue within the total revenue was not as high as the OECD average. 
The OECD average is 61.2%, while in Poland it is 54.1%, in Slovakia it amounts to 
48.0%, in the Czech Republic it accounts for 47.1% and in Hungary it is only 
43.9%. Here the structure of government revenues changed significantly, grants and 
other contributions increased by 16.7 percentage points, at the expense of taxes from 
2009 to 2011 (OECD 2013a). 
Only in Hungary and in the Czech Republic tax revenues as a percentage of 
GDP are higher than the OECD average. Figure 8 illustrates that revenues show 
a gradual decrease in Slovakia. 
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Figure 7.8. Tax revenue as percentage of GDP 
Source: own study based on OECD.Stat. 
In 2011, central government expenditures accounted for 45.4% of GDP on average 
across OECD countries. Here again, Hungary had a higher value (49.6 %), the other 
Visegrad countries spent less than the OECD average. 
 
 
Figure 7.9. General government expenditures as a percentage of GDP  
in 2001, 2009 and 2011 
Source: (OECD 2013a, p. 75). 
Social protection was the largest component of government spending in every 
country under survey. It was followed by health, which had the highest ratio in the 
Czech Republic (in the Czech Republic it was 18.1%, whereas the OECD average 
was 14.5%). Except for Slovakia, the Visegrad countries spend more on economic 
affairs, than the OECD average. Hungary and Poland increased this type of their 
spending between 2001 and 2011, whereas the Czech Republic decreased it 
significantly by 6.4% during the analysed period. The costs of social protection 
increased in almost every country as a result of the financial and economic crisis, but 
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in the analysed period Poland decreased it by 4.9%. On the one hand because 
Poland performed relatively well during the crises (it maintained continuous growth) 
on the other hand because of the introduced reforms as a response of the crisis (for 
example pension reform, public employment reform) (Novotný, 2013). 
Table 7 shows the structure of general government expenditures by function in 
2011 and the change in the structure of expenditures from 2001 to 2011. 
On average, general government debt across OECD members amounted to 
78.8% of GDP in 2011 (OECD 2013a). Only Hungary had above-the-average data 
(85.6%), in Poland it was as high as 63.4%, in Slovakia it accounted to 48.1 and in 
the Czech Republic it was only 47.8%. 
Although the redistribution in the Visegrad countries was high, the trust in 
governments remained at a low level, which seems to be due to their common 
heritage from the socialist era. In 2012 only 21 % of respondents in Hungary had 
confidence in their national government. In the Czech Republic the results were even 
worse with 17%. Both in Poland and Slovakia this ratio was also below the OECD 
average (Gallup 2012). 
Table 7.8. Structure of general government expenditures by function (share of total 
expenditure, 2011) 
Functions  
Czech 
Republic 
Hungary Poland Slovakia OECD 
General public services 10.7 17.5 13.4 15.4 13.6 
Defence 2.1 2.3 2.7 2.7 3.6 
Public order and safety 4.3 3.9 4.2 6.4 3.9 
Economic affairs 13.9 14.4 13.0 9.8 10.5 
Environmental protection 3.1 1.5 1.6 2.7 1.6 
Housing and community amenities 1.9 1.6 2.0 2.6 1.6 
Health 18.1 10.4 10.9 15.5 14.5 
Recreation, culture and religion 2.9 3.5 3.0 3.0 2.7 
Education 11.4 10.5 12.8 10.6 12.5 
Social protection 31.7 34.5 36.6 31.3 35.6 
Source: (OECD 2013a, p. 76). 
There is a strong correlation between perception of corruption and trust in 
governments. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index, Poland had the 
highest score, it ranked 38th on the international scale. Other Visegrad countries 
received worse scores, Hungary was the 47th, the Czech Republic ranked 57th, 
Slovakia took 61st place on the Index ranking2. 
                                                            
2 Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results 
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The low trust level is considered a huge problem in the business sector as well. 
The Visegrad countries attempt to find ways to combat corruption. For example they 
take measures to improve contract enforcement or apply legislative measures to 
increase the investor confidence. 
The Visegrad countries introduced open-door policies for foreign investors after 
the political transition. It was critical to create and maintain a favourable, stable and 
reliable business environment. 
After the opening the market to multinationals, the legislation aimed to 
improve the business environment and maintain competitiveness. However, at the 
same time the sector of small and medium-sized companies came into the focus of 
this legislation. Every country under survey paid great importance to promoting 
small and medium-sized companies and enhancing their competitiveness. 
Table 7.9 The year of passing economic laws which were important from investment 
perspectives 
Law 
Czech 
Republic 
Hungary Poland Slovakia 
The first regulation on foreign investments 1985 1972 1986 1985 
Permission of 100% foreign ownership  1989 1988 1988 1989 
Opening the Stock Exchange  1993 1990 1991 1993 
Company Act 1992 1988 1991 1992 
Competition Act 1992 1990 1990 1992 
Bankruptcy laws 1993 1991 1990 1993 
Two-tier banking systems 1990 1987 1989 1990 
Source: WIIW: Transition Report. Forschungsberichte No. 215. 
The Visegrad countries decreased administrative and legal burdens of enterprises. For 
example, the time required to start up a business was reduced and the number of 
documentation to be submitted decreased. To this end, the performance of Hungary 
was considered to be outstanding, and the time necessary to start up a business was 
shortened to 5 days. The countries also improved electronic services and procedures 
(for example making it possible to submit tax returns electronically)3. 
The barriers to entrepreneurship index of the OECD shows that there has been 
a gradual decrease in administrative and legal burdens of entrepreneurship in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia (data of Poland were not available) in the 
past few years. 
Finally, apart from the business environment and government efficiency, there 
is another possible factor which measures the relative competitiveness of different 
                                                            
3 Doing Business, Business Reform Summaries: http://www.doingbusiness.org/reforms 
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countries. This factor is the tax-competitiveness. It depends not only on the 
favourable tax levels but on the computability of the tax system as well. Some taxes, 
for example, a corporate tax are relatively low in the Visegrad countries in 
international comparison. However, the tendency of decreasing corporate tax rates is 
a common practise in almost all OECD countries. Between 2010 and 2012 the 
corporate tax rate was below 19 % in every Visegrad countries, but in 2013 the 
Slovak Republic increased it to 23 %. 
All Visegrad countries apply a flat personal income tax rate. Hungary was the 
last among Visegrad countries that introduced this type of tax only in 2011 (16 % 
flat rate). The tax and social security wedges on labour influenced the 
competitiveness of Hungary in the most negative way compared to the four analysed 
countries. While in other Visegrad countries the average personal income tax ranged 
between 5.5-24.7%, in Hungary it ranged between 26.3-35.4%. This meant that the 
tax wedge was outstandingly high. 
 
 
Note: Index scale of 0-6 from least to most restrictive. The indicators cover formal regulations in the 
following areas: state control of business enterprises; legal and administrative barriers to 
entrepreneurship; barriers to international trade and investment. Not all data are available for all 
countries for all years. 
Figure 7.10. Barriers to entrepreneurship 
Source: OECD Product Market Regulation 2013 http://stats.oecd.org 
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Table 7.10. ´All-in´ average personal income tax rates at AW by family type, 2013 
Country 
All-in rate All-in less cash transfers 
single 
one-earner 
married couple 
single 
one-earner 
married couple 
no 
child 
two 
children 
no 
child 
two 
children 
single with 
two children 
no 
child 
two 
children 
Czech 
Republic 
22.8% 13.8% 14.5% 5.5% 3.7% 14.5% - 6.5% 
Hungary 34.5% 26.3% 34.5% 26.3% 14.1% 34.5% 15.3% 
Poland 24.7% 18.0% 23.4% 18.0% 18.0% 23.4% 18.0% 
Slovakia 22.8% 17.7% 15.7% 10.6% 12.1% 15.7% 5.1% 
All-in: The all-in tax rate, calculated as the combined central and sub-central government income tax 
plus employee social security contribution, as a percentage of gross wage earnings. All-in less cash 
transfers: The combined central and sub-central government income tax plus employee social security 
contribution, less family benefits (in respect of dependent children) paid by general government as 
universal cash transfers, as a percentage of gross wage earnings. 
Source: OECD Tax Database 
Consumption taxes as a percentage of GDP had the greatest ratio in Hungary 
(15.5% in 2011), the second in the rank was Poland with 12.2%. The consumption 
taxes in the Slovak Republic and in the Czech Republic were close to the OECD 
countries’ average (OECD 2013b). The VAT rates were higher in all the Visegrad 
countries than in the OECD countries. However they were more or less predictable, 
except for Hungary, where the tax rate had changed quite frequently. 
Table 7.11. VAT rates in Visegrad countries in the years 2000-2012 
Country 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Czech Republic  22 22 22 19 19 20 20 
Hungary  25 25 25 20 20 25 27 
Poland  22 22 22 22 22 22 23 
Slovakia 23 23 19 19 19 19 20 
Unweighted OECD average 18.0 17.9 17.9 17.7 17.7 18.0 18.7 
Source: OECD Tax Database. 
7.5. CONCLUSIONS 
According to the FOI model analysis the Visegrad countries have a macroeconomic 
competitiveness edge over other OECD countries in investment conditions and 
government intervention. The group’s advantage is quite obvious in some cases. 
They have the lowest labour costs within the European OECD members; the 
corporate tax rates are also among the lowest in the OECD, although corporate taxes 
have been dropping all over the world for the past decades; and they offer very 
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generous investment incentives (both tax relieves and substantial government grants 
and subsidies connected to the level of investment and the number of jobs created).  
In other cases one can only detect relative advantages, meaning that compared to 
other factors, where the Visegrad countries fare quite badly, in some elements of 
investment conditions and government intervention they are close to the OECD 
average, and improving. Although corruption has been traditionally an issue in the 
region, several steps were taken in all four countries to counter the problem. 
The legal and administrative burdens on enterprises have been dropping all the time, 
thanks to moves that made it easier to acquire licences, to handle transactions with 
the state electronically. 
Overall the FOI model shows that the Visegrad countries try to gain 
a competitiveness advantage over their more developed rivals by focusing on the 
attraction of outside resources (capital and technology). The low tax rates and labour 
costs, the decreasing legal and administrative burdens all point into this direction, 
these are instruments however that also affect the competitiveness of local businesses 
as well. 
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